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Abstract 
This article on the epistemology of computational models stems from an analysis of the Gaïa 
Hypothesis (GH). It begins with James Kirchner’s criticisms of the central computational 
model of GH: Daisyworld. Among other things, the model has been criticized for being too 
abstract, describing fictional entities (fictive daisies on an imaginary planet) and trying to 
answer counterfactual (what-if) questions (how would a planet look like if life had no 
influence on it? ). For these reasons the model has been considered not testable and therefore 
not legitimate in science, and in any case not very interesting since it explores non actual 
issues. This criticism implicitly assumes that science should only be involved in the making of 
models that are “actual” (by opposition to what-if) and “specific” (by opposition to abstract). 
I challenge both of these criticisms in this article. First by showing that although the testability 
– understood as the comparison of model output with empirical data – is an important 
procedure for explanatory models, there are plenty of models that are not testable. The fact 
that these are not testable (in this restricted sense) has nothing to do with their being 
“abstract” or “what-if” but with their being predictive models. Secondly, I argue that 
“abstract” and “what-if” models aim at (respectable) epistemic purposes distinct from those 
pursued by “actual and specific models”. Abstract models are used to propose how-possibly 
explanation or to pursue theorizing. What-if models are used to attribute causal or explanatory 
power to a variable of interest. The fact that they aim at different epistemic goals entails that it 
may not be accurate to consider the choice between different kinds of model as a “strategy“. 
KEYWORDS : Gaïa hypothesis ; Computational Models ; Daisyworld ; Artificial Life; 
Explanation; Model Validation 
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Introduction 
The Gaia hypothesis (GH) was originally proposed by Lovelock and Margulis (1974) in a 
foundational article entitled “Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere: the Gaïa 
hypothesis” in which the authors suggested that the influence of life on the geological 
environment may contribute to a global homeostasis, which lead them to compare the 
ensemble comprising all the living beings and the environment with which they interact to an 
organism. The fact that the Earth does not reproduce and can not undergo natural selection 
was pointed out as problematic for the emergence of homeostasis at this level. It was indeed 
argued that it is because genuine organisms can undergo natural selection that they exhibit 
homeostasis and then claimed first that Earth cannot undergo natural selection because it does 
not reproduce, second that appealing to natural selection at lower levels would still carry the 
theoretical problems of group selection (Dawkins, 1982, 235–237). Given these theoretical 
difficulties, GH teleological claims are not justified. Ever since, philosophers of biology 
turned their back to what appeared to be nothing more than a misleading metaphor.  
The fact that GH has been considered to be very controversial by the vast majority of 
biologists and philosophers of science makes it very interesting from a philosophical point of 
view: the intensity of the debate has led to sharp discussion and critiques of several 
epistemological issues. James Kirchner has undoubtedly made the most informed critiques of 
GH. He greatly contributed to a clarification of its explanandum and confronted GH with a 
number of interesting epistemological problems: the role of metaphors in science, the 
demarcation between science and pseudo-science, the nature and roles of models (Kirchner 
1989). 
A substantial scientific literature, mostly led by geoscientists (Lovelock, Watson, Lenton, 
Volk, Kleidon, Kirchner, etc.) but not only (Margulis, Wilkinson), starting in the 1980’s and 
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expanding in the late 1990’s, was dedicated to the development of GH. After the early 
critiques, several directions of research have been envisaged, from empirical to more 
theoretically orientated ones, that took either the form of verbal arguments or of 
computational models. It is worth noting that the very first answer to critiques did not take the 
form of verbal arguments addressing the status of natural selection, or of the import of 
elements from general philosophy of science (those came later in the debate), but was the 
publication, by Watson and Lovelock (1983), of a simple computational model: Daisyworld. 
This model was criticized by Kirchner (1989, 2002, 2003) on scientific and epistemological 
grounds. At the scientific level, he claimed, the hypotheses of the original model were too 
strong. I will not discuss in details all the pertinent scientific critiques raised by Kirchner and 
partly answered afterwards. 1  The second kind of critique that Kirchner raised is an 
epistemological one. It dismisses the model Daisyworld – or rather, as I will show, the 
questions Daisyworld is meant to answer – as non-scientific at worst, and not interesting at 
best. Contrary to the scientific critiques, epistemological ones have not been taken so 
seriously by the authors of GH.  
Rather than beginning with general philosophical considerations over the status of models in 
science and then evaluating how they could be used or applied in the context of GH, this 
article will proceed the other way around. It starts with a brief overview of GH to understand 
where the debate on models originated from. It then makes explicit the critiques addressed to 
Daisyworld by elaborating a typology of different kinds of models used in the context of GH. 
The typology contrasts the supposedly wrong kinds of model (“abstract” and “what-if”) with 
                                                 
1 For reviews, see Wood et al. (2008), McDonald-Gibson et al. (2008), Lenton and 
Williams (2009), Dutreuil (2013). 
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allegedly better kinds of model (“actual and specific”). What good are abstract and what-if 
models? The question is twofold: (i) are “abstract” and “what-if” models legitimate in 
science? And, (ii), are they useful? Contra Kirchner, I will argue that the answer to both 
questions is a positive one, i.e. that the problems faced by GH are not epistemological (and 
therefore do not concern the legitimacy of GH’s kinds of question or model); rather, the 
problems encountered by GH models, if any, are conceptual ones (they concern the meaning 
of some terms) or scientific ones (the hypotheses made by the models).  
The typology thus elaborated will prove to be fairly general and the different types of models 
studied will be shown to be pervasive across the sciences. The discussion over the 
epistemological status and interest of abstract and more particularly of “what-if” models aims 
at contributing to recent philosophical discussions over the status of models in science. So the 
overall ambition of this paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying the debate over the status of 
some of the models designed by GH authors: as such, it tackles an issue that is internal to GH. 
But it also strives to extend its scope beyond GH to touch upon philosophical considerations 
over the status of models in science more generally. 
 
1. Daisyworld: The model and its critiques 
GH, often misleadingly summarized as a metaphor comparing the Earth to an organism, is not 
commonly thought to be worth consideration by the scientific community, and even less so by 
philosophers of science.2 However, carefully (or bluntly) dismissing the question “Is Earth 
                                                 
2 Sarkar and Plutynski’s judgement of GH as being a “philosophically intriguing idea at 
the fringe of science” (2010, p. xxiii, my emphasis) belongs to the more sympathetic 
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‘really’ alive?” as not interesting is not enough to reject GH. This question as such may not, 
indeed, be interesting; more generally it may also be that the broader question “is X really 
alive” is not interesting and that one should focus on more specific properties than “being 
alive”, as Sober (1991) has argued. But it is also not the question that GH raises. Neither does 
GH consider that invoking the fact that Earth is alive provides any meaningful explanation of 
any biological or geological phenomenon. 
Instead, as I have argued elsewhere, drawing in part on Kirchner (1989), GH focuses on three 
different questions (Dutreuil 2012):  
– (i) Does life influence geological phenomena (climate, the composition of the atmosphere 
and oceans)?  
– (ii) Can the influence of life on its environment affect Earth’s habitability?  
– (iii) Can life’s activity regulate environmental variables?  
Question (i) is unproblematic per se. If there is a contention, it belongs to the history of 
science and regards the role that GH had in drawing attention to the influence that life may 
have on its environment. The crux of the matter lies in question (ii) and (iii) and in their 
distinction; both can be understood as instances of a broader question: “Can life benefit from 
its influence on the environment?” which is central to GH and to a later movement in ecology 
                                                                                                                                                        
positions within the community. According to Ruse (2013), part of the reasons for the 
rejection of GH by evolutionary biologists, besides epistemological issues, are to be found 
in the own insecurity and tension that existed within evolutionary biology at the time GH 
was proposed (chap. 8).  
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and evolutionary biology, the niche construction literature.3 Maintenance of habitability is 
obviously also a question of regulation; so question (iii), in that it deals with regulation per se 
– and not with regulation as a mean to achieve habitability – is tied to stronger claims of GH 
attributing to life’s influence the capacity to make the environment optimal for life. In 
conclusion, GH’s explanandum cannot be reduced to the question of whether one can 
genuinely compare Earth with an organism. 
Surely, everyone agrees that it was pertinent to point out early, as Doolitle (1981) and 
Dawkins (1982) did, that a mechanism responsible for the maintenance of homoeostasis at a 
planetary level was required, given the fact that natural selection does not operate at this level. 
But then a reasonable philosophical and scientific attitude consists in paying attention to the 
propositions that are made or to the explanations that are offered, and not in dismissing the 
whole GH literature as unscientific for asking a question it does actually not ask.  
 Since the early 1980’s, then, the central problem of the GH has been to find a mechanism 
that could maintain homeostasis at the scale of the Earth. Watson and Lovelock (1983) made 
one move in this direction. And again, they did not do so through a conceptual analysis of the 
notion of reproduction or theoretical refinements on the conditions under which natural 
selection occurs: they built a computational model, Daisyworld.  
The original model stages what the authors describe as an “imaginary planet” where the 
evolution of temperature depends on only two parameters: average planetary albedo and an 
external forcing, a gradual increase of solar luminosity. The planet is populated by two 
species of daisy: black ones have a lower albedo (0.25) than the bare ground (0.5) and white 
                                                 
3 On GH and niche construction, see Free and Barton (2007), Pocheville (2010).  
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ones have a higher albedo (0.75). Therefore the relative proportion of white and black daisies 
(covering the ground) influences the planet’s albedo, and hence temperature. In return, the 
temperature constrains the growth of daisies. So life affects an environmental variable that is 
affected by an external perturbation and that constrains life’s growth in turn. The model is 
fairly simple, consisting of a few differential equations, and does not explicitly describe space 
(see fig. 1.a). The central conclusion drawn by Watson and Lovelock is that “regardless of the 
details of the interaction, the effect of daisies is to stabilise the temperature”; and this occurs 
without any form of selection acting at the level of the system itself. 
There are three important features of the Daisyworld model. The first interesting aspect of 
Daisyworld is what I will temporarily call its “fictional” dimension. Recall that the title of 
Watson and Lovelock (1983) was “Biological homeostasis of the global environment: the 
parable of Daisyworld” (my emphasis) and that the model was taken to describe an imaginary 
planet. Many subsequent Daisyworld papers used words pertaining to the semantic field of 
fiction when talking about their model: “parable”, “imaginary planet”, “toy model”, “toy 
world”, “a caricature of the Earh system”, “fictitious Daisyworld”, “metaphor”.4 
Although this vocabulary is common in the modelling literature, it was criticized by Kirchner 
in the following words: 
Building and testing quantitatively appropriate models of real-world 
atmosphere-biosphere interactions, although harder work than building hypothetical 
Daisyworlds, is likely to yield more relevant insights for Earth system science. 
Recent modelling efforts by Lenton and colleagues (Lenton, 2001; Lenton and Von 
                                                 
4 For a detailed review, precise quotations, references and pages, see Dutreuil (2013). 
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Bloh, 2001; Lenton and Watson, 2000) are a step in the right direction. (Kirchner, 
2003, 40–41)  
There is no such thing in the world as this simple planet populated by two population of giant 
daisies. It seems, then, that Daisyworld describes and strives to understand the behaviour of 
fictional objects (as opposed to actual). Should science take time and energy to understand 
objects that do not exist and if so, why?  
The second interesting aspect of Daisyworld is its abstract, as opposed to specific, nature. The 
abstract/specific distinction pertains to the level of description. Specific questions bear on 
particular processes while abstract ones focus on properties that are shared by different 
processes. Kirchner questions the relevance of models that would be too abstract: 
Second, it is important to move beyond simply theorizing. [...] After several decades 
and several iterations of Gaia theory, there is an urgent need for that theory to be 
tested against data. Unfortunately, Gaïa theory makes predictions that are abstract 
and qualitative, making them difficult to test in the real world. (Ibid., my emphasis) 
The test of Gaïa theory and models against data has been one of the principal concern of 
Kirchner, as one can see by looking at the title of its principal contributions: “The Gaïa 
hypothesis: can it be tested” (1989), “The Gaia hypothesis: fact, theory, and wishful thinking” 
(2002), “The Gaïa hypothesis: conjectures and refutations” (2003). I acknowledge the 
important contributions of Kirchner when he tries to move the discussion toward an 
assessment of the empirical relevance of some claims of GH (Kirchner 2002, 395–398, 
Kirchner 2003, 26–29). However, his claim of the impossibility to test the conclusions of 
Daisyworld qua model (1989, 230), or, more recently qua “abstract model” (2003, 38), 
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deserves further discussion over the meaning of “abstract” and over the way models are 
constrained by the empirical world.5   
The third and last characteristic of Daisyworld is the exploration of counterfactual worlds, 
worlds that contradict in relevant respects certain properties of the actual world; this 
exploration relies on what I will call “what-if” questions. As Kirchner (2003) noted:  
Many of the proposed tests for Gaïa are based on assessing whether Earth’s surface 
environment would be different without life. Would an abiotic Earth be less resilient 
and resistant to perturbation (Lenton, 2002)? Would the environmental conditions 
prevailing on an abiotic Earth be less conducive to biological productivity (Kleidon, 
2002)? These hypotheses have the advantage of being fairly precise, but the 
disadvantage of being untestable in practice. They also have the more serious 
disadvantage of being far removed from the most pressing issues in Earth system 
science – namely, how the climate system works and how it will evolve in the future. 
(Ibid.) 
We have drawn three distinctions so far: fictional/actual, abstract/specific, what-if/actual. 
Note that the abstract/specific distinction is orthogonal to the two others. One can for instance 
explore “what-if” questions at a specific level of description (what would be the actual 
temperature of Earth if angiosperms had not arisen and influenced erosion processes?) or at an 
                                                 
5 Kirchner also worries about the simplicity of Daisyworld which may not reflect the 
complexity of the world; for a discussion of this point, see Dyke and Weaver (2013), 
Dutreuil (2013). 
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abstract one (how would “environment” differ if “life-in-general” was not to affect it?). We 
will see later in what regard “what-if” differs from “fictional”. 
Kirchner brought to the fore very interesting epistemological questions, on which Lovelock 
himself has not been very clear, not to say contradictory (Kirchner 2003, 37) or purposefully 
provocative. However, I think that some of Kirchner claims are disputable and that, in any 
case, these questions deserve more space and more discussion than Kirchner’s account. 
Kirchner did not clearly draw the above distinctions. Nonetheless, it is clear that he is 
suspicious of the terms on the left (fictional, abstract, what-if). The first reason for this is that 
these models are (allegedly) about something else than the “real” world; in reading Kirchner, 
it seems that “real” means specific and actual. I do not want here to engage in metaphysical 
debates – do abstract phenomena exist? are counterfactual worlds less real than the actual 
one? – but will instead examine whether science should engage (and if so, why) in the study 
of abstract or counterfactual worlds. The second cause for worry for Kirchner is that abstract 
or what-if models are not “testable”, which is problematic for the Popperian stance ostensibly 
adopted by Kirchner. Interestingly, Kirchner opposes the questionable models with what he 
thinks to be a better practice: recent models from Lenton and colleagues, who propose 
specific models of the actual climate. 
Two different questions are thus raised: (i) are fictional, abstract and what-if models 
epistemologically sound: are they scientific? are they useful? (ii) Are they less useful than 
other kinds of model? In the following, I will show that they are scientific and useful, and also 
briefly touch on the latter question. 
 
3. Description of the models 
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Before engaging in a close description of Daisyworld, and other, related models, I want to 
briefly discuss what models are. One makes a model of a target system in order to gain 
knowledge, by explanation or prediction, of this particular target system. Making a model can 
be thought of as a particular strategy within science at large (Godfrey-Smith 2006, Weisberg 
2007). Regardless of the conception of model that one adopts, two central elements will be 
preserved: models are representations and models rest on an analogy between the model 
system and the target system (the model system must resemble in relevant ways the target 
system). A famous example, discussed by Weisberg, is the Lotka-Volterra system of 
equations (the model system) representing prey/predator interactions between fishes in the 
Adriatic sea (the target system). Models can be implemented in different substrates: some 
models rely on concrete physical objects, others are mathematical, others computational. All 
models discussed here are computational. Although computational models are based on 
mathematics, they can be (and should be) distinguished from purely mathematical models 
(e.g. Lotka-Volterera equations) since they function differently in practice (Weisberg, 2013, 
20) and since they raise particular epistemic and philosophical issues in that they are 
computational and not only in that they are models (Humphreys 2009, Grüne-Yanoff and 
Weirich 2010).  
I pointed out above that the lexical field of fiction was common in the scientific literature on 
models. This was in fact the starting point for recent accounts which treated mathematical 
models as fictional entities (Godfrey-Smith 2009, Frigg 2010). This view is opposed to the 
one that takes mathematical models to be abstract mathematical entities (Weisberg 2013, ch. 3 
and 4). The debates thus bears on what mathematical models are and not what they are about, 
or what the nature of their target system is.  
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Whether one conceives model systems as abstract or fictional may lead one to face different 
difficulties regarding how knowledge can be attained by them (Levy 2012). The debate just 
mentioned thus concerns the ontological status of the model system, an issue on which I will 
remain neutral. Instead, I will use “abstract”, “fictional” and “what-if” as terms qualifying the 
target of the model, the system the modeller wants to gain knowledge about. This, I think, 
does more justice to Kirchner’s discussion. Kirchner has not dismissed all kinds of model as 
works of fiction, he has only dismissed those that seem to be about abstract or counterfactual 
entities.  
In the following, I will first describe in detail one model described as “a step in the right 
direction” by Kirchner (2003, 39) and then turn to examples of the abstract and what-if 
models that he deemed problematic. 
3.1 “Good” models: specific and actual 
In 1982, one year before the publication of Daisyworld, Lovelock and Whitfield published a 
paper entitled “Lifespan of the biosphere”. Their discussion was rooted in the so-called “faint 
young sun paradox”: climate on Earth seems to have remained stable in the last 4.5 Gyr even 
though solar luminosity has kept increasing. Lovelock and Whitfield suggested that life may 
have had an important role to play in fostering silicate erosion, which would have lowered the 
partial pressure of CO
2
 (pCO
2
) during the past billion years, balancing the increase of solar 
luminosity. However, since pCO
2
 is already very low now, if no other balancing mechanism 
takes place, temperature will steadily increase in the next hundreds millions of years, as solar 
luminosity keeps increasing. The biosphere is thus threatened either through a long-term 
increase of temperature, or through CO
2
-starvation, which raises the question of its future 
lifespan.  
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Lenton and von Bloh (2001), cited by Kirchner as a “good” model, is one of the five other 
models that followed on the topic (Caldeira and Kasting 1992; Franck et al. 2000, 2006; Li et 
al. 2009). All models aim at answering the question “How long will the Earth remain 
habitable?”. These five models thus need to do two things: (i) evaluate what the most relevant 
environmental variables constraining the survival of actual living beings are; and (ii) quantify 
the evolution of the variables that are important to sustain life. As to (i), the answer 
importantly depends on the living beings taken into account: photosynthetic life may 
disappear because of CO
2
-starvation if pCO
2
 falls below a certain threshold, complex life may 
disappear because of too high a temperature (greater than 50°C), and in any case no known 
form of life will remain when the temperature will be so high that water will have escaped 
Earth. As to (ii), the simulation calculates the evolution of pCO
2
 and of mean temperature 
(two linked variables) based on a simple climate model and on other parameters: solar 
luminosity predicted from models of stellar evolution, weathering rate, etc. 
3.2 Two kinds of abstract models 
There are two kinds of abstract models, “abstract simpliciter” and “abstract and fictional”. 
“Abstract simpliciter” models are exemplified by the FLASK model, first published by 
Williams and Lenton (2008). They describe the model as follows: 
[It] simulates an evolving population of microbes suspended in a flask of liquid, and 
hence the name. There is a prescribed supply flux of different nutrients into the flask 
and corresponding removal fluxes proportional to the concentration of each nutrient 
in the flask. There are also non-nutrient “abiotic” environmental variables. The flask 
is seeded with a clonal population of model microbes [...]. ( Lenton and Williams 
2009, 67)  
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This model seems to be describing things that one could observe in the actual world (flasks of 
microbes). However, it becomes clear when reading the article in detail that what really 
interests the authors (the scope of the model) is the abstract properties of the living beings 
represented: the authors ask us not to focus on the specific properties of the flask by giving 
arbitrary names to the nutrients (N1, N2, ...). Likewise, they abstract away from a specific 
strain of microbes, taking the “microbes” to be exemplars of what it is to be a living organism 
in general. The model is thus presented as giving us a potential mechanism for homeostasis to 
emerge at the scale of the Earth. The target system of this model, and of other variants of 
Daisyworlds that have been published, are the abstract properties of living beings and the 
consequences of these properties on the environment. This has been made explicit in 
statements such as: “organisms have an effect on their environment”, “organisms can only 
survive in a certain environment”, “there are constraints or limits on adaptation” 
(McDonald-Gibson et al. 2008, 654). Such statements illustrate what Weisberg calls 
“generalized models”: 
A generalized model of sexual reproduction isn’t supposed to be about kangaroo sex 
or fungi sex, but about sex itself.[...] But nothing in the world looks like “sex in 
general”. There is kangaroo sex, Tasmanian devil sex, and human sex, but not sex in 
general. Sex in general is an abstraction over these more specific kinds of sex. 
(Weisberg 2013, 116)  
Whereas it mattered for the specific models described in the previous section that the 
particular molecule consumed by photosynthetic activity was CO
2
 (because CO
2
 was 
involved in other specific relations to other items of the model), for abstract models, the 
particular nature of the nutrient and waste will be irrelevant: only the fact that all living beings 
take up nutrient and excrete waste will matter. To be sure, all models may be thought to imply 
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a degree of abstraction; this is after all what makes science interesting: it abstracts away from 
local, individual, particular, specific phenomena. Moreover, the specific/abstract distinction 
comes in degrees, contrary to the actual/what-if, or to the actual/fictional distinctions: a class 
of properties may be more or less abstract. 
In Weisberg’s view of abstract or generalized model, in some cases the target system and the 
model system have the same level of abstraction: the model represents exactly the abstract 
features of interest of the target system, no less, no more. This would be the case for what I 
called the “abstract simpliciter” models, described above. What I mean by “abstract 
simpliciter” –  models in which the target system and the model system have the same degree 
of abstraction – will be better understood by contrast with models that are not “abstract 
simpliciter”, namely “abstract and fictional” model. In the latter case, for different reasons, 
the modeller does not build a model that is exactly as abstract as its target system: the model 
is more specific than the abstract properties of interest.  
A very good example of such “abstract and fictional” models is provided by the original 
Daisyworld paper. As Watson and Lovelock (1983, 284) put it, “We are not trying to model 
the Earth but rather a fictional world which displays clearly a property which we believe is 
important for the Earth”. Their model proceeds in two steps: (i) it abstracts away to important 
properties of living organisms and their planetary environment (organisms are affected by and 
affect in return their environment which is besides constrained by an external forcing), (ii) it 
imagines fictive with specific properties coherent with the abstract properties identified 
before. What distinguishes abstract simpliciter from actual and fictional model is that in the 
latter case some properties of the entities described verbally are actually implemented in the 
model and specified in the equations (here through the parametrisation of the albedo of the 
daisies, their preferred temperature, and so on). The intention of the authors is not to gain 
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knowledge about the speculative Daisyworld, it is to draw lessons from the analysis of 
Daisyworld, that can be applied to Earth. This can only be done on two conditions: first if, in 
the given context of inquiry, the relevant abstract properties of the model system are similar 
enough (given one’s fidelity criteria) to the abstract properties of the target system (Earth and 
its living beings); second if the authors clearly define the intended scope of their model.6 So 
in the original Daisyworld, the model is much more specific (because of all the details about 
the daisies) than its target system (abstract properties common to all living beings). For these 
reasons, Daisyworld is a good example of what I called “abstract and fictional”: its relevant 
abstract properties resemble that of our actual world while irrelevant specific properties (the 
parametrisation of daisies albedo and growth) differ from it. 
One question still remains: should one adopt “abstract simpliciter” rather than “abstract and 
fictional” models in a particular context of inquiry? It is interesting to take a look at the 
historical path that led, in the case of the GH, from the latter to the former. About a hundred 
variations of Daisyworld have been published since 1983. Some of these variations 
progressively gave up on important elements of the Daisyworld style (weird daisies and 
specific details) and became more explicitly “abstract simpliciter”. This was done in part by 
symplifying the initial model and by focusing more on the abstract properties of the entities 
(Harvey 2004, Williams and Noble 2005, Dyke and Harvey 2006, McDonald-Gibson et al. 
2008). This was also done through the initiation of new kinds of models getting rid off the 
daisies and hinging on the Artifical Life (A-life) tradition, such as Downing and Zvirinsky 
(1999). The FLASK model hails from this A-life branch. It is interesting to point out that 
                                                 
6 For details about “fidelity criteria” and “intended scope”, see Weisberg (2013), section 
3.3. 
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despite fictional details being progressively abandoned by some models, others kept the 
“abstract and fictional” style, such as Boyle et al. (2011) or Weaver and Dyke (2012). We will 
discuss whether one should choose between “abstract and fictional” and “abstract simpliciter” 
at the end of the paper, as it is related to the epistemic purposes of the models. 
3.3 What-if models 
What-if models rely on the comparison of two different scenarios. Here I use scenario to 
denote the outcome of a model in a given configuration. What can be changed in a model 
to produce different scenarios is the values of the initial parameters and, to some extent, 
part of the model structure (the relation between some properties of the model). The main 
figure of the original Daisyworld paper shows the evolution of the temperature in two 
different scenarios (fig. 1a): one in which the model is run in normal or actual mode, and 
one in which the influence of life on the environment is artificially switched off (the 
“what-if” scenario: “what if life had no influence on the environment?”). In this case, a 
relevant parameter of the model (the influence of life) is artificially switched off in order 
to compare the outcome of the actual scenario with that of the what-if scenario. A quite 
similar approach can be found in experimental biology when one knocks off a gene of a 
model organism and compares the phenotypes of the mutants and wild type. So what-if 
scenarios differ significantly from “fictional” worlds since fictional models represent 
entities that differ from the actual world with respect to irrelevant specific properties but 
resemble it with respect to relevant abstract properties; by contrast the what-if scenarios 
differ from the actual world for relevant (supposedly the most relevant) properties.  
I called “what-if model” the practice consisting in comparing the outcome of the same 
model run in two different scenarios (one actual, one “what-if’). Here we have thus two 
pertinent units of analysis corresponding to two different practices of modelling: the 
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scenario and the model. The scenario and the model differ regarding their epistemic 
purposes. Both can be interesting as such : in the case of the what-if scenario, one is 
genuinely interested in something else than the actual world whereas in the case of the 
what-if model, one is interested in the particular role played, in the actual world, by the 
principal variable of interest, namely the one that is switched off or changed in the 
“what-if” scenario. The what-if model constitutes an autonomous unit of description, 
distinct from the scenario, in that what carry the explanatory power is the comparison 
between two different scenarios.7 In all the GH cases discussed, what-if scenario are 
never explored as such but always in a context of a what-if model. So, clearly, the 
question that interests the authors is the role played by life in the actual world. 
                                                 
7 One may worry that it may not be warranted to talk about one model and to talk about the 
same model (run in two different scenarios) since not only the values of some parameters 
may be modified but also the structure of the model. First, the modification of the 
structure that takes place here can actually be thought of as a borderline case of the 
change of the value of some parameters (bringing one parameter to zero). Second, calling 
model-A and model-B the two different scenarios does not change my argument, namely 
the idea that the comparison between the two (models or scenarios) is a particular 
modelling practice, which, as it will be argued below, is epistemologically sound and has 
a praticular epistemic purpose. 
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Fig. 1: a. Personal reproduction of Daisyworld central figure, first published in Watson and 
Lovelock, 1983, fig. 1, d, bottom. The figure has been reproduced based on the equations of 
Watson and Lovelock 1983 and on the procedure instructions given in its section 2 and 3. The 
legends “biotic” and “abiotic” have been added, based on Watson and Lovelock 1983 
discussion in the text.  
 
Fig 1. b. Reproduction of Lenton and von Bloh (2001) figure (1. a., in the original article). All 
curves show the evolution of temperature as solar luminosity (time) increases. Both 
simulations are run in two different scenarios: one in which the influence of life on the 
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environment is switched on (biotic), another one in which it is switched off (abiotic: the 
“what-if” scenario defined in this paper). 
 Some what-if models are also abstract models such as – FLASK and Daisyworld – , others 
are specific ones such as the model proposed by Lenton and von Bloh that I discussed above 
(2001; see fig.1b) : the distinction between what-if and actual is thus orthogonal to the 
distinction between abstract and specific. Besides, authors not involved in the development of 
GH have adopted similar strategies, wondering for instance how Earth would look like had 
Earth’s geomorphology not been influenced by life (Dietrich and Perron 2006); the making of 
what-if models is therefore not an oddity specific to GH modellers.  
4 Discussion of the models 
After having tried to clarify what I mean by abstract and what-if models I will first address the 
issue of their trustworthiness and legitimacy. I will then proceed to discuss the epistemic 
roles) of each model, and, based on this discussion, question the idea that the choice between 
these different kinds of model should be construed as a strategy.  
4.1 Trustworthiness and legitimacy of the models 
In order to address the issue of the legitimacy and trustworthiness of computational models it 
is useful to start with Kirchner’s remarks on their testability. Two senses of “testability” can 
be distinguished in his 2003 article. One seems to be restricted to the comparison of model 
predictions with empirical data: I shall refer to this use of the term as testabilityO (for 
“output”). The second sense is broader and close to Popper’s criterion of demarcation between 
science and pseudo-science. Although Popper has remained popular among scientists 
(Pigliucci 2008), it is worth remembering that Popper’s demarcation criterion (falsifiability) 
has been seriously put into question for being too narrow in some cases and too wide in others 
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(e.g. Lakatos 1978); its pertinence has in particular been questioned when applied to the 
intelligent design debate (McCain and Weslake 2013, Sober 2008, 128–131). I will not linger 
on such general philosophical issues and will choose to understand Kirchner’s appeal in a 
simpler and uncontroversial way, namely that models should at some point be constrained by 
the “real” world, at least if they are to tell us something about the world. 
This being granted, it should not be forgotten that important sources of reliability in a model 
have nothing to do with empirical data, or with the “external world”: they are internal to the 
model itself (Oreskes et al. 1994, Barberousse and Vorms 2013, Winsberg 2006). Verification 
of numerical solutions (through benchmarking procedures) is a good example of procedures 
that are important for the reliability of a model; checking the good behaviour of the numerical 
simulation after the integration of all the algorithms (routines) is another example. However, 
these purely computational and mathematical aspects, though important for the reliability of a 
model, are not our principal matter of concern: what we want to know is how the external 
world comes into play with a model, how it constrains it in relevant ways so that the model 
can tell us “something” about the world. The answer to this epistemological question crucially 
depends on what the “something” is that the model is supposed to tell us. In other words, the 
way the external world will constrain our model ultimately depends on the reasons for which 
the mode was made. 
So why does one make computational models? There are two answers to this question: to 
explain or to predict. A computational model can be construed as a tripartite object 
comprising a model structure (defining relations between properties) that is fed with input 
values (initial conditions of variables and parameters, that constitute different scenarios) in 
order to gives us output values (the model predictions). Hence, there are two things in which 
one may be interested, two reasons why one may build the model in the first place and, 
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accordingly, there are two different ways the external world may come into play. In the case 
of predictive models one relies on the model structure to obtain predictions only. 
Meteorological models constitute a good example: one relies on the model structure (based on 
the laws of thermodynamics and of fluid mechanics) and on the initial parameters (pressure 
and temperature fields observed at a given time), to get a prediction of tomorrow’s weather. In 
the case of explanatory models one relies on the match between predictions and empirical 
data to obtain potential explanations of a phenomenon of interest. One good example may be 
found in the explanation of the flocking behaviour observed for particular birds: although one 
does not know what is responsible for this emergent phenomenon, an agent-based simulation 
that ascribes particular behaviour rules to entities seems to reproduce the flocking behaviour; 
so a candidate explanation of the phenomenon is that birds, in nature, obey to rules that are 
similar to the ones implemented in the simulation (Huneman 2012). 
As one can see the description of what is an explanatory or predictive model is highly 
intertwined with the issue of how the external world comes into play to constrain or test the 
model in question. I will thus first clarify the distinction between predictive and explanatory 
models and then argue that this distinction is the most relevant one if one wants to discuss the 
“testability” Kirchner seems to be interested in, and that the distinctions abstract/specific and 
what-if/actual are not the relevant categories in this discussion. 
(i) Only explanatory models are testableO. 
Again, the reason why one builds an explanatory model is that one wants to identify the 
potential or candidate explanation for a particular phenomenon of interest. The aim is to 
identify the causal processes that can lead to a phenomenon. In order to do so, one builds a 
model that represents possible relations between properties (the model structure) before 
examining whether the model structure proposed is a good candidate explanation of the 
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phenomenon at stake. To know if it constitutes a candidate explanation, one has to test 
different putative scenarios and show that some lead to the prediction of the phenomenon of 
interest (these are the candidate explanations) while others do not. So clearly, here, 
testabilityO (the comparison between the model predictions and empirical values) is a 
necessary procedure to discriminate between candidate explanations. So in the case of 
explanatory models, it is not only possible to carry out the comparison but also necessary 
given the epistemic aim of the model. Notice that the procedure cannot help one to prove that 
the candidate explanation is the actual explanation of the phenomenon; it will remain a 
candidate, or possible explanation only (Huneman 2012, Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich 2010). 
Along these lines, some have advocated the idea that the test of different scenarios  
constitutes a “numerical experiment” (Parker 2009; for contrasting views on the idea that 
numerical simulation allow one to carry out experiments, see Winsberg (2009), Grüne-Yanoff 
and Weirich (2010)).  
This description concerns all explanatory models. Again, the explanatory/predictive 
distinction is orthogonal to the specific/abstract distinction. Testability is a straightforward 
process in the case of specific explanatory models (one just needs to compare the model 
predictions with empirical values obtained by other means); let us see how it would work for 
abstract explanatory models. I think it is in fact no more problematic: nothing prevents one 
from testing abstract explanatory models (in the sense of comparing the model predictions 
with observational data). Indeed nothing prevents one from abstracting away from empirical 
values and carrying out a qualitative comparison between these values and the model 
predictions. Kirchner is even caught red-handed doing it when he – pertinently – criticizes 
ecological Daisyworld model for predicting the stability of ecosystems when observations 
show the instability of such systems, (Kirchner 2003, 40).  
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(ii) Predictive models: why should we trust them?  
The case of predictive models is different. Consider again meteorological models. Let us take 
for granted that they were built in order to have reliable predictions of tomorrow’s weather. 
Needless to say, one wants the prediction before tomorrow evening. The event in question has 
not occured yet (or, in other cases, one does not have access to it by any other means than 
through the model) so the output of the model cannot be compared with anything. 
Now, regarding the possibility to compare the output with empirical values, there are two 
different categories of predictive models. In some cases, one will have a model that previously 
made predictions that one was able to compare with empirical values, and one now wants to 
use this model for a new (genuine) prediction for which one does not yet have empirical 
values. One may then inductively trust the new predictions because it happens that all the 
previous ones were successful, even if they were so in part for unknown reasons (some data 
assimilation procedures in meteorological models may be good examples of this category). In 
other cases, one never has been and never will be (in practice) able to compare any 
predictions of the model with empirical data. Either because the future is too distant, or 
because one will never have a proxy for the past phenomenon of interest. All GH models are 
of the latter category (the comparison is never possible). A good example is the lineage of 
“lifespan” models (which, interestingly, received the favour of Kirchner). The knowledge one 
expects to gain from these models is the amount of time during which Earth will remain 
habitable: this is an extreme case in which the prediction of the model will of course not be 
comparable, in theory or in practice, to the “actual value”. So why should one rely on such 
predictive models?  
Again, in the case of such predictive models one cannot compare the output with empirical 
data. It does not matter at all whether these predictive models are abstract or specific; their 
26 
predictive nature makes them not testable
O
. The missing piece of the puzzle is the output, the 
prediction: one built the model in order to obtain the data the model predicts, because one 
could not access these data otherwise. There is no such option as “I don’t like models and 
prefer doing experiments” – (for a similar argument, see Winsberg 2003, 2006). This means 
that the reliability of the output of such predictive has to be ascertained on its own. 
Let us try to clarify the situation. In the case of predictive models there is a system on which 
one thinks one has sufficiently good knowledge; one knows (or one relies on) the relation 
between the properties that are important to specify the dynamic of the system and one knows 
(or one relies on) the values of the parameters for a given state of the system. And what one 
wants to have is the description of the same system at a different time, in a different state. The 
initial state may be far back in the past or may be the actual state, and the final state (the 
prediction) may be in the future (e.g. meteorological models) or in the past (e.g. climate 
models of the precambrian): so “prediction” should not be understood here in its 
chronological sense, one can make predictions for past phenomena. 
Here one relies on the predictions in virtue of relying on the source procedure that led to 
them: the initial conditions and parameters, the model structure, and the computational 
process. One may rely on the source procedure for different reasons: one used pieces of 
reliable knowledge (laws, theories, comparison with other models, etc.) that were established 
before or elsewhere, one used trustworthy model building techniques and made sure no 
relevant parameter was forgotten. When one wonders about the reliability of a model, one 
never wonders about the reliability of the “model as a whole” but always focuses on parts of 
the model, either the output, either the model structure: in the case of predictive model one 
wonders whether the model predictions are reliable (given your amount of trust in the model 
structure and the values of the parameters). By contrast, recall that for explanatory models one 
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examines whether the explanation proposed (the model structure) is a potential explanation 
(given the success of the comparison of the output with empirical values). So explanatory and 
predictive models are opposites as to their epistemic situation.8 
Let us now examine how this would work when we introduce the specific/abstract categories, 
to show that they are not the relevant categories to discuss the testability of a model.  
In predictive models one has to make sure that the modelling procedure accurately captures 
the properties of one’s target system9. So there is a point where discussion is open as to 
whether the model faithfully represents the empirical world; it is here that the “external 
world” will constrain the model. And the striking point is that this “discussion” does not differ 
much in the case of abstract and in the case of specific models. Such a discussion occurred in 
the case of the lifespan models described above as an example of specific models. Several 
parameters were refined or added after Lovelock and Whitfield proposed their original model 
since these were shown to be quantitatively important: plant metabolism (Caldeira and 
Kasting 1992), a better parametrization of life’s influence on weathering (Lenton and von 
                                                 
8 Notice that the same algorithm may alternatively be used to explain or to predict 
phenomena depending on the epistemic context in which it is used. Besides, I would be 
happy to grant that there are grey cases where it is not clear in which epistemic situation 
(prediction or explanation) we are. 
9 Notice that one may rely on the source procedure even if one knows that part of the 
simulation artificially misrepresents the target but one has other reasons to believe in the 
validity of this model building technique (Winsberg 2006, Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich 
2010). 
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Bloh 2001), and of geodynamic processes (Franck et al. 2000). But the very same sort of 
discussion can and did occur in the case of abstract models. Kirchner showed the problems 
that some hypotheses of Daisyworld create in misrepresenting life. He pointed out that the 
model does not allow the existence of black daisies whose optimal growth temperature would 
be higher than white daisies. Such a situation would create a pathological, instable 
Daisyworld (Kirchner 1989, 229). In other words the environmental preferences and the way 
in which the daisies affect their environment could not vary independently. The problematic 
hypotheses were henceforward abandoned (Wood et al. 2006, McDonald-Gibson et al. 2008, 
Wood et al. 2008). So for specific as well as for abstract models that claim to represent certain 
properties of life, one may always come up with counterexamples that demand adjustments of 
the model. The upshot for abstract models is that, although the model itself is a priori and is in 
a sense not meant to be testable, the claim that the model structure faithfully captures a 
particular empirical target is itself testable in the sense Kirchner demands (see Weisberg 2006 
and Bedau 1999 for analogous points). 
I would now argue that the epistemological status of the data produced by what-if and specific 
scenarios is the very same as the status of the data produced by predictive, specific and actual 
scenarios. Note that the unit of focus here is the scenario and not the model, since, within a 
what-if model it is more precisely the what-if scenario that may be thought to raise particular 
issues. One may indeed have specific concerns regarding the what-if scenario (and not 
regarding the actual scenario) in that its target does not (or cannot) exist out there (which is 
not the case for the actual scenario). But with respect to testability and to the reasons why one 
should trust a scenario, is there really a difference between the two? I think there is none. To 
come back to the example used in section 3.3 of this paper, one should rely on the “abiotic” 
curve (the what-if scenario) of Lenton and van Bloh’s lifespan model for the very same 
reasons that one relies on the biotic curve (the actual, specific and predictive scenario) in 
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figure 1.b. In both cases there is no possibility of comparing the prediction with empirical 
data. So in both cases, the reliability of the data comes from one’s ability to make a good 
simulation based on sound source procedures. The fact that the target system genuinely exists 
or not is not relevant as to the status of the data produced. If the precedent claim is correct and 
if one does not worry about predictive and specific models, then one should not worry either 
about what-if scenarios (and thus not about what-if models).  
The overall conclusion is that “abstract” and “what if” are not the right categories to discuss 
the procedures increasing the reliability of a model; the distinction between predictive and 
explanatory models is a better help. We have seen that only in the case of explanatory models 
can you compare the model predictions with empirical data. This should in no way lead us to 
disregard predictive models – which are pervasive in all sciences – but rather to acknowledge 
that the reasons why we rely on the predictions are different from the reasons why we rely on 
the model structure. Neither abstract nor what-if models should be thought to be outside of 
science, even when adopting an updated Popperian stance. 
4.2 Interest of abstract and what-if models 
Let us now turn to the reasons why one may be tempted to make abstract and what-if models. 
Why would one want to make such models? Why not be satisfied with specific and actual 
models after all? I would like to suggest three reasons: 
(i) Abstract and fictional models are good for how-possibly explanations. 
We have seen that the entities involved in “abstract and fictional” models are meant to 
resemble actual organisms regarding relevant abstract properties (in the given context of 
investigation, properties that concern the interaction between organisms and their 
environment) but to differ from them regarding irrelevant specific properties (here the fact 
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that the entities are huge daisies). What can be the purpose of these apparently irrelevant 
specific details? In some cases they do not have any purpose but the model will be more 
specific than its target for contingent reasons or practical constraints.  
I will however argue that in other cases – such as the original Daisyworld model – such 
specific details may serve a distinct purpose. It becomes more apparent if one realizes that the 
original model was meant to achieve a “how-possibly explanation” in the sense defined by 
Dray and discussed by Reydon (2012). How-possibly explanation in Dray’s sense are 
explanations that should not invoke laws of nature because how-possibly explanations do not 
intend to establish the necessity of the phenomenon to be explained.  “As their aim is to 
establish that the occurrence of the explanandum is not entirely ruled out,” Reydon explains, 
how-possibly explanations “only need to specify those conditions that allow for the 
explanandum to occur even though given the theoretical and factual context it seemed 
unlikely or even impossible” (2012, 303).  
The definition seems to fit perfectly with the aim of Daisyworld. Recall that it is because 
natural selection was presentend as the sole explanation of organisms’ homeostasis and 
because of theoretical difficulties (absence of natural selection at a planetary level or 
problems raised by group selection) that the idea of a global environmental regulation was 
claimed to require planning or foresight by life. As Lovelock stated, Daisyworld was meant to 
address this critique:  
The purpose of this article is to [...] present a simple model, called ‘Daisy World’, 
specifically developed to show that global homeostasis does not need foresight or 
planning by life. Lovelock 1983, 67, my emphasis.  
In other words, Daisyworld was presented to show that even in the absence of natural 
selection at the global scale and without teleology involved, a regulation of the global 
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environment through the influence of life is not theoretically impossible. As pointed out by 
Kirchner (2002, 401), if the ambition of the paper was to claim that given our current 
knowledge of the abstract properties shared by all living beings, homeostasis or maintenance 
of habitability should necessarily emerge, then the model would not be able to meet this 
ambition since, as mentionned above, the original Daisyworld only illustrates a restricted case 
in which the environmental preferences and the way in which the daisies affect their 
environment can not vary independently. But if the ambition is only to show that homeostasis 
could emerge in plausible biological and geological contexts, then Daisyworld does the job 
(Kirchner 2002, 401). 
This is precisely the reason why the “specific” details implemented in Daisyworld may 
ultimately matter: the model is supposed to exhibit a detailed example in which a 
phenomenon occurs whereas it was thought to be theoretically impossible. Although Reydon 
(2012, 309) seems to express scepticism about the existence of how-possibly explanations as 
defined by Dray, we have seen that the original Daisyworld may, interestingly, be a good 
candidate matching such a label. Weisberg (2013), after others (Brandon 1990), has claimed 
that “generalized modelling” (which corresponds to our “abstract models”) may be used to 
propose how-possibly explanations in what seems to be a broader acception of how-possibly 
explanations. Considering Reydon’s stricter conception leads us to claim that not all “abstract 
(or generalized) models” can be used to obtain how-possibly explanations: only “abstract and 
fictional” models can be used so, precisely because they contain more specific details than 
“abstract simpliciter” models. 
(ii) Abstract simpliciter models are good for pursuing theorizing. 
One reason to make abstract simpliciter models would be that abstract (computational) models 
are means (among others) of pursuing theorizing (Pigliucci 2013); such models offer a library 
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of candidate explanations for general phenomena. It is interesting in this respect to compare 
the hypotheses of Daisyworld models (see section 2.2 for examples) with what Scheiner and 
Willig (2008) think of as the basic statements of a general theory of ecology: “organisms are 
distributed in space and time in a heterogeneous manner”, “Organisms interact with their 
abiotic and biotic environments”, “Resources are finite and heterogeneous in space and time”, 
etc. In both activities, either theorizing with abstract models such as Daisyworld, or theorizing 
with verbal arguments in the case of Scheiner and Willig (2008), there is a focus on abstract, 
general properties shared by living organisms. 
However, one may dislike theorizing. If there is something wrong with “theorizing in general” 
then the problem is not GH, but theorizing. So, though theorizing is a perfectly sound 
enterprise, it may have been plagued by misguided past attempts in GH: but one is then 
confronted with a scientific, and not an epistemological problem (some of the hypotheses 
were too strong). But if the problem is (mostly) scientific (which I think it is) then there is no 
epistemological problem inherent either to GH or to abstract and what-if models, in which 
case the two main points of my paper are made. Authors of the GH explain why they develop 
such abstract computational models as follows:  
The computer may seem like an odd place to be looking for a planetary-sized 
phenomenon when we could be examining the real world. However, with a sample 
size of only one Earth the inferences that can be drawn about the likelihood of certain 
features are necessarily limited. (…) By creating many virtual worlds in the 
computer, we can begin to examine whether features we see on Earth, such as 
abundant recycling and environmental regulation, are likely or unlikely phenomena 
once life has emerged on a planet. (Lenton and Williams 2009, 61)  
33 
This echoes the debate in the GH literature about whether environmental variables on Earth 
have in fact been regulated by life and, if this is the case, whether it was due to pure chance or 
due to a necessary regulation by life (Watson 1999). Indeed, it may be the case that certain 
environmental variables are regulated on Earth, or that Earth would not have been habitable 
today if life had not influenced the environment. These questions can be investigated through 
concrete observations (oceanographic and atmospheric measurements) or thanks to specific 
computational models (the lifespan models). But in order to assess how likely (or necessary) 
the emergence of environmental regulation is (given the important properties of life), one 
needs to explore different counterfactual scenarios and one does so thanks to an abstract 
(computational) model. In order to evaluate the “likelihood of certain features”, which in the 
context of the above quotation is the likelihood of environmental regulation given the 
influence of life on its environment, one thus needs to assess the abstract properties of life. In 
this sense, the discussion over the legitimacy and epistemic purpose of GH abstract models 
echoes the debate in the A-life literature over the legitimacy of abstracting away to the 
fundamental properties of life while leaving aside what is taken to be contingent details, 
which questions the theoretical role that the concept of “life” may be able to play (Lange 
1996, Bedau 2007). 
Let me clarify further. When one wants to know how long Earth will remain habitable for 
actual living beings (the question tackled by the lifespan models), one only needs to know 
what is living (bacteria, photosynthetic organisms and complex organisms are), what the 
environmental variables that constrain their survival are, and how these will evolve in the 
future (notwithstanding the evolution of environmental preferences of organisms). However, 
GH authors seem to think that living beings have a special influence over their environment 
that makes them different from non-living entities. So they go further and put a special 
emphasis on what it means for an entity to be living in general. Let us consider the habitability 
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question now in an abstract mode: if one wants to show that living organisms, qua living 
beings, necessarily enhance habitability, then a correct explanation will require to show how 
some core features of what it means to be alive are linked with processes leading to an 
increase of the time during which the living entities at stake are maintained in their integrity 
(habitability). With abstract models GH postulates (or rather, it bets) that living beings share 
some properties that distinguish them from other entities in the world; as Lange (1996) would 
put it, they bet that life may be a natural kind and thus may become explanatory as such. On 
the questions raised by GH, recent abstract models have brought interesting results, 
constraining the conditions under which regulation can emerge given the nature of the 
relations between organisms and their environment: regulation cannot emerge if the 
characteristic timescale of the dynamic of organisms’ adaptation to the environment is higher 
than the characteristic timescale of the dynamic of organisms’ influence on their environment 
(Williams and Noble, 2005, Weaver and Dyke, 2012), natural selection acting at the level of 
the community can enable the emergence of a regulation at the level of the ensemble of the 
communities (Williams and Lenton, 2008, see Wood et al. 2008, Dutreuil 2013 for a review 
of the other principal results brought by the Daisyworld litterature). 
So GH has developed abstract models to abstract away from contingent details about life and 
its environment and highlight a number of core features, just as A-life does. Abstract 
(computational) models may be useful when evaluating the likelihood of the clustering of 
certain properties while empirical inquiries will be confronted with a unique sample.10 This is 
something specific and actual models simply cannot do; so the issue lies not with choosing a 
                                                 
10 Huneman, this issue, offers a detailed and interesting discussion of the way the 
evaluation of the likelihood can be carried out. 
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strategy for model building but with accepting the question at stake as a legitimate question or 
not: is it legitimate to bet on the contingency of certain features of life? It may turn out not to 
be so, but the debate is much larger than GH per se and pertains to theoretical biology, A-life 
and the philosophy of biology at large.  
(iii) What-if models are important to attribute causal or explanatory power. 
After having discussed the interest of abstract models, let us examine the role played by 
what-if models. Please, notice that the unit of analysis is not the what-if scenario but the 
what-if model (comprising the what-if scenario and the “normal” or “actual” scenario). This 
modelling practice, qua modelling practice, seems to have received less attention from 
philosophers of science than, say, “abstract (mathematical) modelling”, whereas they are 
clearly distinct. What-if models have been discussed by Weisberg (2013) when he examined 
Fisher’s strategy to explain why biological populations have only two sexes. In order to do so, 
Fisher imagines a three sex population with a formal model and explores the consequences of 
such an hypothesis. At the end of the day, what one expects from these models is not so much 
the description of a world that is possible but not actual. One temporarily needs this 
description in order to compare it with the actual scenario and to conclude that the difference 
between the two (actual and what-if scenarios) can be imputed to the variable artificially 
switched off or changed.  
One may thus compare worlds with and without the influence of life so as to bring into relief 
the role played by life in the actual world. What-if models may here be crucial steps in the 
explanation of a phenomenon. This interpretation would fit with the conception of causality 
defended by Woodward (2010) and seems to fit perfectly with the account of explanation 
given by Strevens (2004, ch. 4.3). The procedure of progressively removing parameters from 
a model (the “eliminative procedure” described by Strevens) to see if the phenomenon to be 
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explained still holds after this removal is a crucial step in determining whether the parameter 
is a difference-maker and whether it is a good explanation of the phenomenon of interest. 
Although the space for developing the argument is lacking here, it seems that this strategy 
(“what-if” or eliminative procedure) would be as essential to non-causal accounts of 
explanation as it is to Strevens’ causal account. Let us see how this would work with 
Huneman’s (2010) topological explanations, a kind of explanation that may be thought of as 
non-causal (but need not be so depending on one’s conception of causality): artificially 
removing connections or knots from a topological networks to see if certain properties 
(robustness, stability, etc.) still hold seems to be an important step in attributing explanatory 
power to the given topology of the initial network. 
 
Let me summarize the role of the different kinds of model discussed in the preceding:  
– “Abstract and fictional” models may enable one to obtain how-possibly explanations (they 
help one to show that an event that was previously thought to be theoretically impossible is 
in fact possible); the original Daisyworld of Watson and Lovelock was used in this way.  
– “Abstract simpliciter” models allow one to pursue theorizing and explore the likelihood of 
the clustering of certain properties; some later variants of Daisyworld as well as A-life 
models such as FLASK were used for these purposes, to assess the conditions under which  
“regulation” will emerge. 
– “What-if” models may be construed as a necessary enterprise in imputing explanatory (or 
causal) power to one variable of interest. Different models were presented to use this 
strategy: Daisyworld, Lenton and Von Bloh lifespan model. 
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In the section dedicated to the description of the models we raised the question of the 
epistemic priority of “abstract simpliciter” over “abstract and fictional” models: in the past 
decade, some Daisyworld models were explicitly made “abstract simpliciter”, whereas others, 
such as Boyle et al. (2011) or Weaver and Dyke (2012), fully aware of Kirchner’s critiques, 
conserved the “abstract and fictional style”. The issue of giving priority to one or the other 
model only makes sense in the context where they are used to obtain similar knowledge. 
Boyle et al. (2011), as well as Weaver and Dyke (2012), did not propose “abstract and 
fictional” models to obtain how-possibly explanation, in contrast to Watson and Lovelock 
(1983). They rather pursued the kind of knowledge obtained by “abstract simpliciter” models. 
Is one strategy better than the other? I would argue that they are epistemologically on a par, 
although one may have an aesthetic preference for one or the other. Indeed one can wonder 
what is the relevant difference (in the context where one wants to obtain abstract knowledge) 
between Daisyworld style models and abstract models such as FLASK. There is none. The 
first model describes fictive specific entities with which we are not familiar (huge daisies) 
while the second describes more familiar entities (flasks of microbes), but then both warn the 
reader: the specific story does not matter, so please, abstract away from these details (do not 
look for giant daisies in the world, do not look for specific nutrients). Since the specific details 
do not matter given the purpose of the model, then whether these details are “fictive” or more 
“familiar” should not worry us.  
This brings me back to the idea implicitly developed by Kirchner (and recalled in the second 
section) that some models may be of greater value than others. We have seen here that the 
different models (specific, abstract, actual, what if) serve different epistemic purposes and 
help us answer different kinds of question. They are not different ways of pursuing a common 
goal, but different ways of pursuing different goals: how-possibly explanations for actual 
phenomena (abstract and fictional), evaluation of the likelihood of the clustering of some 
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properties (abstract simpliciter), attribution of causal or explanatory power to one variable of 
interest (what-if). I have argued that to engage oneself in trying to explore any of these 
directions is an epistemologically valid enterprise. If it turns out that all different models 
(specific, abstract, what-if) are epistemologically sound then the debate over the relative 
interest of certain models vs. others (in Kirchner’s terms, whether there are some more 
“pressing” issues than others) can not be discussed on a purely epistemological ground. The 
issue is not how to best allocate epistemic resources to attain a unique goal, it is a question of 
comparing different epistemologically legitimate goals. So the only pertinent level of 
argumentation is social and not epistemological. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Let us sum up the main arguments developed throughout this paper. 
First, it is simply not the case that testability – understood as the comparison of the output of a 
model to empirical data – is always a necessary procedure to have reliable models. This 
procedure is only available in the case of explanatory models when one wants to discriminate 
between possible explanations implemented in the model structure (but even in these cases, 
this procedure is not the only one important for assessing the reliability of the model). In the 
case of predictive models, the comparison is not possible. One then uses the model in order to 
obtain the output (the prediction) and one relies on the prediction in virtue of relying on the 
source procedures that enabled the predictions (the initial parameters and the model structure). 
The prominent role that the explanatory/predictive distinction plays when it comes to the 
reliability and testability of a model makes it clear that the initial typology based on 
Kirchner’s critique (actual and specific, abstract simpliciter, abstract and fictional, what if 
models) is of little help in this context. 
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However – and this is the second principal argument of the paper – this typology is useful 
when it comes to discussing other epistemic purposes of the models. We have seen that the 
discussion over the (relative) interest of these different models should not be cashed out in 
terms of strategy since these different kinds of model are used to pursue different epistemic 
roles: how-possibly explanations in the case of abstract and fictional models, pursuing 
theorizing and exploring the likelihood of the clustering of certain properties in the case of 
abstract simpliciter models, attribution of causal or explanatory power to one variable of 
interest in the case of what-if models. 
These two main arguments, although stemming from a discussion of a given field of science 
(GH), aimed at contributing to general philosophical considerations on the role of models. 
Back to GH now, they rebut the principal epistemological criticisms addressed to GH models 
by Kirchner. Besides, this analysis sheds light on one particular aspect of GH: the special 
emphasis that it puts on the role of life. Consider first the particularity of the what-if models 
of GH in which the influence of life is switched off. The authors never switch off, say, the 
influence of geodynamics on the climate, but always contrast scenarios with and without the 
influence of life. This brings into relief the particular interest GH shows for life: GH is above 
all an hypothesis about the consequences of life on Earth. Consider now the implication of 
developing abstract models of the interaction of life with its environment. These models 
require something that actual and specific models do not: they require a definition of life. 
The postulate that living beings may be distinct from non-living entities is in fact a bet; it may 
very well in the end turn out that the influence of life has nothing special as to its magnitude, 
as to how it affects habitability or how it regulates the environment. Interestingly, GH, by 
working on such questions and deploying such strategies to answer them, joins up with the 
fields of research (A-life, exobiology, origins of life) which, given their question of interest, 
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need to rethink the problem of the definition of life (something the other branches of biology 
need not do; see Morange 2003, Gayon 2010). This should not come as a surprise since the 
definition of life was one of the fundamental starting points of GH (Lovelock 1965) and since 
the fields of research mentioned above emerged from roughly the same institutional and 
intellectual context (Dick and Strick 2005). 
 
Acknowledgement 
I am indebted to all those present at the EASPLS meeting (Geneva, September 2012) and at 
the Duke Consortium for the history and philosophy of biology (June, 2013) for giving me 
their comments on these ideas, especially to Marie Kaiser and Tyler Curtain. I would like also 
to thank warmly Frédéric Bouchard, Jean Gayon, Philippe Huneman, Arnon Levy, Arnaud 
Pocheville and Judith Villez as well as an anonymous reviewer who helped me significantly 
improve earlier versions of this paper. I must finally thank Staffan Müller-Wille for his 
careful reading which has greatly contributed to the clarification and amelioration of the 
submitted version. 
References 
Barberousse A. and Vorms M., 2013, “Computer simulations and empirical data”. In: Durán 
J.M. and Arnold E. (Eds.), Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific 
experimentation. Cambridge Scholars publishing, 29–45. 
Bedau M., 2007, “Artificial Life”. In: Gabbay W., Thagard P., Woods J. (Eds.), Handbook of 
the philosophy of science, Volume 3: Philosophy of biology. North Holland: Elsevier, 
595–613. 
41 
Bedau M.A., 1999, “Can unrealistic computer models illuminate theoretical biology”. In: 
Annie S. Wu (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1999 genetic and evolutionary computation conference 
workshop program, Orlando, Florida, July 13, 20–23. 
Boyle R., Lenton T. and Watson A., 2011, “Symbiotic physiology promotes homeostasis in 
daisyworld”, Journal of theoretical biology, 274(1): 170–182. 
Brandon R., 1990, Adaptation and environment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Caldeira K. and Kasting J., 1992, “The life span of the biosphere revisited”, Nature, 
360(6406): 721–723. 
Dawkins R., 1982, The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selection. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, USA. 
Dick S.J. and Strick J. E., 2005, The living Universe: NASA and the development of 
astrobiology. New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University Press. 
Dietrich W. and Perron J., 2006, “The search for a topographic signature of life”, Nature, 
439(7075): 411–418. 
Doolittle W., 1981, “Is nature really motherly”, CoEvolution Quarterly, 29: 58–63. 
Downing K. and Zvirinsky P., 1999, “The simulated evolution of biochemical guilds: 
reconciling Gaia theory and natural selection”, Artificial Life, 5(4): 291–318. 
Dutreuil S., 2012, "L’hypothèse Gaïa : pourquoi s’y intéresser même si l’on pense que la 
Terre n’est pas un organisme?", Bulletin de la société d’histoire et d’épistémologie des 
sciences de la vie, 19(2): 229–241. 
42 
Dutreuil S., 2013, "Comment le modèle Daisyworld peut-il contribuer à l’hypothèse Gaïa?". 
In : Varenne F. and Silberstein M. (Eds.), Modéliser et simuler. Epistémologies et pratiques 
de la modélisation et de la simulation. Tome 1. Paris: Editions matériologiques. 
Dyke J. and Harvey I., 2006, “Pushing up the daisies”. In: Rocha L.M. (Ed), Artificial Life X, 
proceedings of the tenth international conference on the simulation and synthesis of living 
systems, Cambridge: MIT Press, 426–431. 
Dyke J. and Weaver I., 2013, “The emergence of environmental homeostasis in complex 
ecosystems”, PLoS computational biology, 9(5). 
Forber P., 2010, “Confirmation and explaining how possible”, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences, 41(1): 32–40. 
Franck S., Block A., VonBloh W. et al., 2000, “Reduction of biosphere life span as a 
consequence of geodynamics”, Tellus B, 52(1): 94–107. 
Franck S., Bounama C. and VonBloh W., 2006, “Causes and timing of future biosphere 
extinctions”, Biogeosciences, 3(1): 85–92. 
Free A. and Barton N., 2007, “Do evolution and ecology need the Gaia hypothesis?”, Trends 
in Ecology and Evolution, 22(11): 611–619. 
Frigg R., 2010, “Models and fiction”, Synthese, 172(2): 251–268. 
Gayon J., 2010, “Defining life: synthesis and conclusions”, Origins of Life and Evolution of 
Biospheres, 40(2): 231–244. 
43 
Godfrey-Smith P., 2006, “The strategy of model-based science”, Biology and Philosophy, 
21(5): 725–740. 
Godfrey-Smith P., 2009, “Models and fictions in science”, Philosophical Studies, 143(1): 
101–116. 
Grüne-Yanoff T. and Weirich P., 2010, “The philosophy and epistemology of simulation: A 
review”, Simulation and Gaming, 41(1): 20–50. 
Harvey I., 2004, “Homeostasis and rein control: From daisyworld to active perception”. In: 
Pollack J. et al. (Eds), Proceedings of the ninth international conference on the simulation 
and synthesis of living systems, ALIFE, 9, Cambridge: MIT Press,. 309–314. 
Humphreys P., 2009, “The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods”, Synthese, 
169(3): 615–626. 
Huneman P., 2010, “Topological explanations and robustness in biological sciences”, 
Synthese, 177(2): 213–245. 
Huneman P., 2012, “Computer science meets evolutionary biology: Pure possible processes 
and the issue of gradualism”. In: Pombo O. et al. (Eds), Special Sciences and the Unity of 
Science, Springer, 137–162. 
Kirchner J., 1989, “The Gaia hypothesis: can it be tested”, Review of Geophysics, 27(2): 
223–235. 
Kirchner J., 2002, “The Gaia hypothesis: Fact, theory, and wishful thinking”, Climatic 
Change, 52(4): 391–408. 
44 
Kirchner J., 2003, ‘The Gaia hypothesis: conjectures and refutations’ Climatic Change, 58(1): 
21–45. 
Lakatos I., 1978, “Science and pseudo science”. In: Worrall J. and Currie G., The 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical papers, Volume 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1–7. 
Lange M., 1996, “Life,‘artificial life’, and scientific explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 
63(2): 225–244. 
Lenton T. and Von Bloh W., 2001, “Biotic feedback extends the life span of the biosphere”, 
Geophysical Research Letters, 28(9): 1715–1718. 
Lenton T. and Williams H., 2009, “Gaia and Evolution”. In: Crist E. and Rinker H.B., Gaia in 
Turmoil: Climate Change, Biodepletion, and Earth Ethics in an Age of Crisis, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 61–85. 
Levy A., 2012, “Models, fictions and realism: Two packages”, Philosophy of Science, 79(5): 
738–748. 
Li K., Pahlevan K., Kirschvink J., and Yung Y., 2009, “Atmospheric pressure as a natural 
climate regulator for a terrestrial planet with a biosphere”, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 106(24), 9576–9579. 
Lovelock J., 1983, “Daisy world – a cybernetic proof of the gaia hypothesis”, Coevolution 
Quarterly, Summer 1983(38): 66–72. 
Lovelock J. and Margulis L., 1974, “Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere: the 
Gaia hypothesis”, Tellus, 26(1-2): 2–10. 
45 
Lovelock J. and Whitfield M., 1982, “Life span of the biosphere”, Nature, 296: 561–563. 
Lovelock J., 1965, “A physical basis for life detection experiments”, Nature, 207: 568–570. 
McCain K. and Weslake B., 2013, “Evolutionary theory and the epistemology of science”. In: 
Kampourakis K. (Ed.), The philosophy of biology: a companion for educators. Springer. 
McDonald-Gibson J., Dyke J., DiPaolo E. and Harvey I., 2008, “Environmental regulation 
can arise under minimal assumptions”, Journal of theoretical biology, 251(4): 653–666. 
Morange M., 2003, La Vie expliquée? : 50 ans après la double hélice. Paris: Odile Jacob. 
Oreskes N., Shrader-Frechette K., Belitz K. et al., 1994, “Verification, validation, and 
confirmation of numerical models in the earth sciences”, Science, 263(5147): 641–646. 
Parker W.S., 2009, “Does matter really matter? Computer simulations, experiments, and 
materiality”, Synthese, 169(3): 483–496. 
Pigliucci M., 2008, “The borderlands between science and philosophy: an introduction”, The 
Quarterly Review of Biology, 83(1): 7–15. 
Pigliucci M., 2013, “On the different ways of ’doing theory’ in biology”, Biological Theory, 
7(4): 287–297. 
Pocheville A., 2010, La niche écologique: concepts, modèles, applications. PhD thesis, Ecole 
Normale Supérieure, Ecole doctorale Frontières du Vivant. 
Reydon T.A., 2012, “How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful 
heuristics: A comment on Forber”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 43(1): 302–310. 
46 
Ruse M., 2013, The Gaia hypothesis: science on a pagan planet. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Sarkar S. and Plutynski A., 2010, A Companion to the philosophy of biology. USA: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. 
Scheiner S.M. and Willig M., 2008, “A general theory of ecology”, Theoretical Ecology, 1(1): 
21–28. 
Sober E., 1991, “Learning from functionalism: prospects for strong artificial life”. In:  
Langton C., Taylor C., Farmer J.D. and Rasmussen S. (Eds.), Artificial Life II. Boulder: 
Oxford WestviewPress, 749–766. 
Sober E., 2008, Evidence and evolution: the logic behind the science. USA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Strevens M., 2004, “The causal and unification approaches to explanation unified – causally”, 
Noûs, 38(1): 154–176. 
Watson A., 1999, “Coevolution of the Earth’s environment and life: Goldilocks, Gaia and the 
anthropic principle”. In: Craig G.Y., Hull J.H. (Eds), James Hutton – Present and Future. 
Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 150, 75–88. 
Watson A. and Lovelock J., 1983, “Biological homeostasis of the global environment: the 
parable of Daisyworld”, Tellus B, 35(4): 284–289. 
Weaver I. and Dyke J., 2012, “The importance of timescales for the emergence of 
environmental self-regulation”, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 313(21): 172–180. 
Weisberg M., 2006,” Robustness analysis”, Philosophy of Science, 73(5): 730–742. 
47 
Weisberg, M., 2007, “Who is a modeler?”, The British journal for the philosophy of science, 
58(2): 207–233. 
Weisberg M., 2013, Simulation and similarity: using models to understand the world, USA: 
Oxford University Press. 
Williams H. and Lenton T., 2008, “Environmental regulation in a network of simulated 
microbial ecosystems”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(30), 
10432–10437. 
Williams H. and Noble J., 2005, “Evolution and the regulation of environmental variables”. 
In: Capcarrere M.S. et al., Proceedings of VIIIth conference on Artificial Life, Berlin: 
Springer, 332–342. 
Winsberg E., 2003, “Simulated experiments: Methodology for a virtual world” Philosophy of 
Science, 70(1): 105–125. 
Winsberg E., 2006, “Models of success versus the success of models: Reliability without 
truth”, Synthese, 152(1): 1–19. 
Winsberg E., 2009, “A tale of two methods”, Synthese, 169(3): 575–592. 
Wood A., Ackland G. and Lenton T., 2006, “Mutation of albedo and growth reponse 
produced oscillations in a spatial Daisyworld”, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 242: 188–198. 
Wood A., Ackland G., Dyke J., Williams H. and Lenton T., 2008, “Daisyworld: A review”, 
Reviews of Geophysics, 46(1). 
Woodward J., 2010, “Causation in biology: stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of 
explanation”, Biology and Philosophy, 25(3): 287–318. 
